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 Christiana Tings 
The new German European Policy 
Challenges to Decentralised EU Policy Coordination 
1. Introduction: A new German EU policy? 
The inauguration of a new government gives the unique opportunity for 
political renewal. This could also hold true for the German policy towards 
European integration and the European Union (EU). A grand coalition con-
sisting of the Christian-Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social-
Democratic Party (SPD) came to power in November 2005. Within the 
theoretical framework of continuity and change of German foreign policy 
this paper compares the German EU policy during the mandate of Gerhard 
Schröder (SPD) and Angela Merkel (CDU), substantiated by possible insti-
tutional amendments. Does the change of government entail a new German 
EU policy?  
Traditionally, the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is 
marked by a high degree of continuity and reliance on European coopera-
tion
1. The former coalition consisting of the SPD and the Green party in-
troduced a pragmatic approach towards the EU and on the international 
stage
2. Chancellor Schröder pursued a new style of governance that was 
more self-assured and stressed national interests. This also influenced the 
 
1   See Lamatsch, Dorothea (2004). Deutsche Europapolitik der Regierung Schröder 
1998 - 2002: von den strategischen Hügeln zur Mühsal der Ebene. Hamburg: 
Kovac. 
2   Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Gisela et al. (2002). Deutsche Europapolitik von Konrad 
Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, p.215. Christiana Tings 
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substantive German EU policy. How does the current government address 
the dichotomy between traditional support for European integration and 
new pragmatism?  
Formally, the Chancellor and the Cabinet set – based on party decisions – 
the policy guidelines of the German government. However, in contrast to 
international relations theories that often solely focus on national interests, 
institutions play a decisive role in the German interaction with the EU
3. 
This is called the supremacy of procedures over policies
4 and has been 
criticised in the past
5. Germany’s ability to act, its EU capability, is deci-
sive for the nation’s effective representation
6 and the future development of 
the whole Union. Especially during Germany’s EU Council Presidency in 
the first half of 2007, the first to be organised in a triplet of states (Ger-
many – Portugal – Slovenia), this will be tested. Did the change of gov-
ernment affect the coordination mechanisms or is Germany’s EU capability 
constrained by institutionalised continuity?  
 
 
 
3    Bulmer, Simon; Jeffery, Charlie, Paterson, William (1998). Deutschlands eu-
ropäische Diplomatie: Die Entwicklung des regionalen Milieus. in: Weidenfeld, 
Werner. Deutsche Europapolitik, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, pp. 11 - 102. 
4   See Janning, Josef & Meyer, Patrick (1998). Deutsche Europapolitik – Vorschläge 
zur Effektivierung. in: Weidenfeld, Werner. Deutsche Europapolitik, Bonn: Europa 
Union Verlag, pp. 267 - 286. 
5   See Derlien, Hans-Ulrich (2000). German EU-Policy Coordination – Failing Suc-
cessfully? in: Kassim, Hussein, Peters Guy & Wright, Vincent. The National Coor-
dination of EU Policy. Oxford:UP, pp. 54-78; Bulmer, Simon; Maurer, Andreas & 
Paterson, William (2001). Das Entscheidungs- und Koordinationssystem deutscher 
Europapolitik: Hindernis für eine neue Politik? in: Schneider Heinrich, Jopp 
Mathias & Schmalz Uwe (eds.). Neue Deutsche Europapolitik Rahmenbedingungen 
- Problemfelder – Optionen, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag. 
6   Wessels, Wolfgang (2006). Deutsche Europapolitik – Strategien für einen Weg-
weiser: Verstärkter Nutzen durch verbesserte Integration? in: Wessels & Diedrichs 
(eds.) Die neue Europäische Union im vitalen Interesse Deutschlands?, Berlin: 
Netzwerk Europäische Bewegung & Europa Union Deutschland. pp.135-149. 
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Methodology 
The question whether the change of government led to a new German EU 
policy and contributed to the country’s EU capability gains importance 
with the upcoming EU Council Presidency in 2007. 
First, the concept of continuity and change will be developed in order to 
build a theoretical framework for the forthcoming analysis of the new Ger-
man EU policy. It is based on the study of relevant literature of continuity 
and change in foreign policies with special focus on German-EU relations. 
The concept of continuity and change, which was mostly explored after the 
reunification of Eastern and Western Germany and the adoption of the 
Treaty of Maastricht, will be transferred to the current research question.  
Then, the most visible political actors of the former and current govern-
ment, that is to say the German Chancellors and their parties, will be com-
pared. Due to the federal structure of the German state, regional 
governments also play a decisive role in EU policies. The interplay be-
tween the different levels of government would however overstretch the 
scope of this paper and remains to be explored in more detail. The present 
empirical analysis of the federal government is based on the coalition trea-
ties, government policy statements and important political action. Subse-
quently, the paper evaluates the influence of the new government on the 
institutions that shape German EU policy. Next to the relevant actors it will 
be shown how decisions are formed, represented and communicated. The 
institutional structure is developed on the basis of organisation charts, rele-
vant literature and interviews in various institutions.
7 
2. Continuity and Change in German EU Policy 
In the last decades, Germany evolved from a pariah of the international 
community to an equal partner
8. Similar observations can be made with 
 
7  This paper is based on a Master thesis presented in June 2006 as part of the Master 
of European Studies at the Center for European Integration Studies in Bonn. 
8   Bierling, Stephan (2005). Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland : Nor-
men, Akteure, Entscheidungen, München: Oldenbourg, p.307. Christiana Tings 
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regard to the country’s interaction in the EU. While at the beginning of 
European cooperation one major goal was to contain Germany’s power 
such as through the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (ECSC), today the country is a major player in the EU. German na-
tional interest representation, albeit in the framework of the European 
cooperation, gained importance again. The new focus on domestic goals 
stands in contrast to its self-imposed obligation to support European inte-
gration even against short-term national interest. Since 1992, European in-
tegration is an explicit goal of the German state. According to Art. 23 GG
9 
the Federal Republic of Germany shall contribute to the development of a 
united Europe. The German government should therefore align its domestic 
political action with the Community’s interest
10.  
German European policy has been analysed in the context of continuity and 
change especially after the reunification of Eastern and Western Germany 
and the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht
11. The general conclusion was 
that Germany’s foreign relations are subject to a high degree of continuity 
even though incremental adjustments corresponding to structural changes 
in the international system and the EU itself have been made. Uwe Schmalz 
formulated three perspectives on the possible development of German EU 
policy
12. These will be used as reference points for the subsequent compari-
son of the current and former government’s EU policy and its institutional 
structure.  
•  The thesis of continuity entails that European integration coincides with 
German national preferences and is part of the German raison d’état. 
With increasing interdependency of international politics and economy, 
Germany continues to support further European cooperation, even if this 
is against short-term national interest.  
 
9   German basic law – Grundgesetz. 
10  Meyer, Franz (2002). Nationale Regierungsstrukturen und europäische Integration. 
EuGRZ, pp.111 – 124, p.117. 
11  See Schmalz, Uwe (2002). Deutsche Europapolitik nach 1989/90: Die Frage von 
Kontinuität und Wandel. in: Heinrich Schneider, Mathias Jopp & Uwe Schmalz 
(Eds.). Eine neue deutsche Europapolitik? Rahmenbedingungen - Problemfelder – 
Optionen. Bonn: Europa Union Verlag; Müller-Brandeck, (2002); Bierling (2004). 
12  Schmalz (2002), pp. 62-68. The new German European Policy 
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•  The thesis of change states that after the end of the Cold War and with 
Germany’s position as central power in Europe important rationales for 
European integration are obsolete. In the future, the country will focus 
on its domestic interests that can equally be reached through European 
cooperation and unilateral initiatives. Moreover, the country could claim 
a leading position in the EU. 
•  The pragmatic thesis detects an increasing gap between political visions 
with regards to the EU and daily politics. European integration remains 
a German priority. Yet, EU politics are pursued less idealistically and 
more pragmatically. Further integration has to be reasonable and neces-
sary. Germany’s overall influence will increase.  
In the context of continuity and change of German EU policy, the paper 
analyses the political action and institutional structure of the grand coali-
tion in comparison to the former government. It will be tested in how far 
the style of governance, policies and administration changed from the man-
date of Chancellor Schröder to the appointment of Angela Merkel as Head 
of Government.  
3. The Governing Parties and the Chancellors 
The political system of Germany foresees a high number of actors that 
shape its EU policy. These are among others the Chancellor, the Cabinet, 
the German Parliament (Bundestag); the Federal Council (Bundesrat); the 
Constitutional Court and the Federal States (Länder). In addition, interest 
groups and social movements participate in the policy-making process
13. 
Especially, German Chancellors can play – and have done so in the past – 
an important role in German EU policies
14. Therefore, the shift from Mr 
Schröder to Mrs Merkel as Head of Government might have also led to 
substantive changes in German EU policy The influence of domestic actors 
on European policies, especially the constitutional right of the Federal 
 
13    Haftendorn, Helga (1999). Kontinuität und Wandel des außenpolitischen 
Entscheidungsprozesses in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Politische Viertel-
jahreschrift, 40 (PVS-Sonderheft 30), pp. 247-257, 248. 
14  See Bulmer (2001), Müller-Brandeck (2002). Christiana Tings 
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States since the Treaty of Maastricht, limit the Chancellor’s capacity to act. 
With the support of the Constitutional Court the Federal States have for 
example contributed to the increasing German reluctance towards further 
expansion of EU competences
15. The Chancellors, based on the political 
dialogue in their own party and between the coalition partners, nevertheless 
shape German EU policy and represent it in the European Council. 
The Coalition Treaties 
The coalition treaties of governments can be seen as compromises and ac-
cumulations of the participating parties’ positions and bases for govern-
ment action. The former coalition between the Social-Democratic and the 
Green Party was in power from 1999 until 2005. Formally, it carried on 
with the traditional German policy principle of undisputed support for 
European integration
16. In the coalition treaty for the second government 
term, the SPD and the Green Party pledged: “We want to encourage the 
European integration process. Widening and deepening of the EU are the 
main focus of our European political action”
17. On the other hand, the im-
portance of national actors as well as the cooperation between the biggest 
member states France and Germany was stressed
18: “The Franco-German 
cooperation will also play a decisive role in the future. Through a common 
responsibility both countries have consistently given important impetus to 
European integration”
19. Moreover, the German government developed a 
strong bi-lateral link with Russia, which sometimes went against EU inter-
ests e.g. concerning a common European energy policy. In the context of 
continuity and change the former government as exemplified by the coali-
tion treaty pursued a more pragmatic approach
20. National interests were 
advocated multilaterally, but also through unilateral action.  
 
15  Knelangen, Wilhelm (2005). Eine neue deutsche Europapolitik für eine andere EU?, 
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, pp.38-39. 
16  Lamatsch, (2004), p.77. 
17  SPD & The Greens. (2002). Coalition Treaty 2002 – 2006 Renewal – Equity – Sus-
tainability, p.77. 
18  Müller-Brandeck (2002), p. 215. 
19  Coalition Treaty 2002, p.78. 
20  See Knelangen (2005). The new German European Policy 
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Prior to the inauguration of the new German government on 12 November 
2005, the EU experienced one of its most severe crises. After the negative 
referenda on the European Constitutional Treaty in France and in the Neth-
erlands, the European Heads of State and Government called in summer 
2005 for a reflection phase on the future of Europe, which has not led to 
any concrete results so far. Germany is expected to present a road map dur-
ing its Council Presidency in spring 2007. Nevertheless, European affairs 
only played a minor role in the last national election campaign
21. The main 
opponents CDU and SPD reached an almost equal share of votes and had to 
form a grand coalition. All political action now depends on extensive bar-
gaining between the two parties, of which the SPD was also in the former 
governing coalition. Therefore, the German EU policy was not likely to 
change significantly
22. In the coalition treaty the Christian-Democrats and 
the Social Democrats declared: “The EU guarantees political stability, se-
curity and prosperity in Germany and Europe. Only together the Europeans 
can advocate their interests successfully”
23. This statement indicates a more 
pro-European stance of the current government and a renewed commitment 
for multilateral cooperation. 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder compared to Angela Merkel 
As seen in the coalition treaty the Schröder government continued with 
German engagement for European integration but at the same time in-
creased unilateral interest representation. In the light of continuity and 
change, the German EU policy was pursued in a more pragmatic way, 
which also entailed the application of a cost-benefit analysis
24. As illus-
trated in the institutional part of this paper, the former coalition appointed 
the Ministry of Finance as major actor in European affairs. Furthermore, 
 
21  Marhold, Hartmut. Deutsche Europapolitik nach dem Regierungswechsel. Integra-
tion 1/2006, pp.3-22, 1. 
22  Nijhuis, Tom (2006). The European Policy of the Grand Coalition. in: The Foreign 
Policy of the Germany’s Grand Coalition Base line and first assessment of the Be-
ginning of Merkel’s Team, Foreign Policy in Dialogue Vol 6 Issue 18, pp.25-23, 25. 
23  CDU, CSU & SPD (2005). Coalition Treaty Together for Germany. With courage 
and humanity, p. 126. 
24  See Knelangen (2005). Christiana Tings 
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Chancellor Schröder took part in an initiative of the net contributors to 
limit the community budget to 1 % of GDP. Even though Germany allowed 
for some deviation at the European Council in July 2005, the adamant posi-
tion of France and Great Britain finally led to the failure of a budgetary 
agreement. Moreover, the doctrine European policy is domestic policy 
gained importance during the mandate of Chancellor Schröder. As the in-
terdependence of domestic and European policies has grown through the 
extension of the EU’s competences, national policy goals can often better 
be pursued at supra-national level
25. Chancellor Schröder applied this prin-
ciple e.g. during the blockade of the Used Car Directive
26 and the resistance 
to implement the Tobacco Advertisement Directive
27. Even though 
Schröder was increasingly interested in European cooperation, the exam-
ples show that the government was less willing to sacrifice national inter-
ests for the support of European integration
28. 
The first political activities of the grand coalition under Chancellor Merkel 
indicated the return to more traditional characteristics of German foreign 
and European policy
29. She underlined the need for European political co-
operation in her government declaration in November 2005
30 and in her 
 
25  Janning & Meyer (1998), p. 267, Harnisch, Sebastian, Schneider, Siegfried (2003). 
Europa bauen – Deutschland bewahren: Rot-grüne Europapolitik. in: Maull, Hanns 
W.; Harnisch, Sebastian (Eds.). Deutschland im Abseits?: Rot-grüne Außenpolitik 
1998 – 2003, Baden-Baden: Nomos, p.65. 
26  The directive obliged car manufacturers recycle used cars or to pay a fee. This 
would have implied high costs for the German car industry. After the directive had 
already been agreed in the Committee of the Permanent Representatives to the EU 
(Coreper), the German government – against the usual procedure – gathered a 
blocking majority to stop it in the Council of Ministers, see Bulmer (2001), p.14. 
27  Despite extensive lobbying of Germany, the European ministers agreed in 2003 on 
Directive 2003 / 33 EC, which led to a ban on tobacco advertising in all trans-
national media. Germany challenged the directive at the ECJ on grounds that local 
media fall outside EC competences. Advocate General Philippe Léger concluded in 
June 2006 that the directive falls within Internal Market provision. The current gov-
ernment pledged to implement the directive as soon as possible, see Balzan. Berlin's 
legal action on tobacco advertising dealt a blow, EUOBSERVER. Derived from the 
Internet on 10th of June 2006: http://euobserver.com/9/21843. 
28  Harnisch & Schneider (2003), p. 65, p. 75.  
29  Nijhius (2006), p. 27. 
30  Merkel, Angela (2005 November) Government policy statement.  The new German European Policy 
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first parliamentary speech on European affairs as Chancellor in May 
2006
31. Moreover, Merkel repeatedly declared: “We need the European 
Constitution”. Shortly after the inauguration, in December 2005 Germany 
acted as mediator between France, Great Britain and the small and medium 
member states as Poland to reach a deal on the pending EU financial 
framework. Commentators wrote: “If this should prove to be the new style 
of German European diplomacy, Germany might be back on centre stage of 
the EU without creating suspicions about ‘hegemonic’ ambitions or about a 
Franco-German directorate”
32. The German government also pledged to 
implement pending EU laws such as the Tobacco Advertisement Direc-
tive
33 which was still not implemented. The new Chancellor continued the 
initiative of the former government to advocate a global role for the EU. In 
the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Ger-
many for the first time led a military mission, which was send to the De-
mocratic Republic of Congo. It had the task to support the United Nations 
peacekeeping force (MONUC) during the elections in 2006. Chancellor 
Merkel commented in her European policy statement: if European values 
are taken seriously, we cannot restrict our action to internal enforcement. 
We also have to help there, where others cannot protect those themselves
34. 
However, in the first months of governance the German government again 
focused on domestic prerogatives with regard to EU policies and continued 
to reach for national preferences. It blocked the opening of the labour mar-
ket through the amendment of the Service Directive. Due to pressure of 
Germany and France and against the opposition of Great Britain and most 
new member states the completion of the internal market was impeded
35. 
Moreover, during the spring summit in March 2006, Chancellor Merkel 
was reluctant towards the development of a common European energy pol-
 
31  Merkel, Angela (2006 May) European policy statement.  
32  Schild, Joachim (2005 December). Getting Back on Track? The EU's New Finan-
cial Perspective 2007-13, Trier, www.Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.de. 
33  See Balzan (2006). 
34  Merkel (2006 May). 
35  Kazim, Hasnain (2006 May). Dienstleistung in der EU Deutsche Regeln für den 
Klempner aus Polen, Spiegel. Derived from the Internet on 10th of June 2006: 
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,418798,00.html. Christiana Tings 
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icy. She opposed further expansion of EU competences and in addition 
postulated the abolishment of unnecessary EU legislation
36. In conclusion, 
the new German government continues with the pragmatic approach of 
Chancellor Schröder even though returning to multilateral methods as seen 
in the coalition treaty and first policy action. In contrast to the old coalition, 
Germany’s role as mediator during European negotiations became more 
prominent again
37. Nevertheless, the pro-European rhetoric is not always 
enacted in daily politics. As in the pragmatic thesis the gap between politi-
cal visions in contrast to actual policy action of the current German gov-
ernment has increased. As President of the Council in Spring 2007, 
Germany is bound to represent the Communities position and has to set 
aside its domestic interest. Then, the EU capability of Chancellor Merkel’s 
government as well as the institutional structures will be decisive.  
4. Supremacy of procedures over policies? 
Authorised individual or collective actors define their position towards a 
domestic or international policy. Structures and processes that drive politi-
cal action restrain their decisions and behaviour
38. The political actors that 
shape German EU policy are largely dependent on institutional preroga-
tives. Janning and Meyer called this the supremacy of procedures over 
policies
39. In comparison to more centralised systems such as in Great Brit-
ain and France, the German EU policy coordination has been criticised as 
fragmented and ineffective
40. Institutionalised continuity might even re-
strain a change of the overall German EU policy.  
With the inauguration of the new German government the traditional struc-
ture of German EU decision-making and coordination did not change but 
was even restored. The Ministry of Finance lost its role as coordination 
 
36  Merkel (2006 May). 
37  Nijhuis (2006), p. 27. 
38  Haftendorn (1999), p. 246. 
39  See Janning, Meyer (1998). 
40   Derlien, Hans-Ulrich, German EU-Policy Coordination – Failing Successfully? 
(2000). in: Kassim, Hussein, Peters Guy & Wright, Vincent. The National Coordi-
nation of EU Policy. Oxford:UP, pp. 54-78. The new German European Policy 
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unit
41 as before the mandate of Chancellor Schröder. Now the Ministry of 
Economics (and Technology) again coordinates substantive European poli-
cies, while the Foreign Ministry is mostly in charge of bilateral and foreign 
relations
42. The partition of EU coordination units leads to rivalries be-
tween the ministries and can obstruct a coherent German interest represen-
tation
43. Next to the split management, German policies in general and 
therefore also in EU matters are shaped according to the departmental prin-
ciple (Art. 65 (2) GG, Ressortprinzip). Each policy or government initiative 
is prepared and decided upon in the responsible unit of a particular minis-
try
44. The Chancellor only sets policy guidelines and has the right to take 
final decisions (Art. 65 (1) GG Richtlinienkompetenz)
45. Consequently, all 
German ministries are potentially involved in the European policy-process. 
Each of them has to have EU expertise and the German position has to be 
coordinated between a multitude of actors
46. There is no central coordina-
tion unit as in other European member states. External pressures to central-
ise the EU policy making mechanism in Germany have not been strong 
enough
47. Therefore, the German decision-making and coordination system 
for EU policies can still be characterised as decentralised and fragmented
48. 
The negative assessment stands in contrast to the influential role that the 
country played throughout the European integration process. Therefore, 
other scholars comment that its institutions correspond to the complex 
European structures e.g. the organisational separation of Coreper I and II
49. 
In addition, the inclusion of each ministry enables the direct contact of 
 
41  BKOrgErl: Organisation order of Chancellor Schröder, Bonn, 27 October 1998. 
42  BKOrgErl: Organisation order by Chancellor Merkel, Berlin  22 November 2005.  
43  Derlien (2000), p. 56. 
44  The central government’s power is furthermore restraint by the Federal States.  
45  Meyer (2002), p. 115. 
46  Fuchs, Anja (2004). Does Central Organisation Matter? Thesis presented for the 
Degree of Master of European Studies, College of Europe; Bulmer, 2001; p. 17; 
Meyer (2002), p. 116. 
47  Fuchs (2004), p. 54. 
48  Lamatsch (2004), p. 37. 
49  See Maurer, Andreas (2003). Germany: fragmented structures in a complex system. 
in: Wessels, Wolfgang, Maurer, Andreas & Mittag, Jürgen (Eds.) Fifteen in to one? 
The EU and its Member States, Manchester, pp. 115-149. 
 Christiana Tings 
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German and EU civil servants in order to increase the technical expertise of 
both actors. However, unlike in the national policy cycle, the domestic ad-
ministration is not directly involved in the preparation of the respective  
legislation. Among the European institutions the Commission is the sole 
institution that proposes legislation. In addition, the European policy mak-
ing process often follows short time frames, that make the consultation of 
the German Bundestag and sometimes even between ministries difficult.  
Competing Actors of German EU policies 
As laid down in Art. 23 GG and Art. 79 GG, the German Parliament 
(Bundestag) and the Federal Council (Bundesrat) need to approve Commu-
nity legislation that affects the German basic law. In order to fulfil this task 
they ought to be informed continuously about European affairs by the gov-
ernment
50. Both institutions have special EU committees; however, in prac-
tice the high number of legislative initiatives and short policy cycles limit 
their participation
51. The European Constitutional Treaty would have given 
national parliaments ex-ante control to legitimate EU legislation. However, 
until now the German administration retains a high degree of independence 
in European affairs. The main actors are the Chancellor’s Office, the For-
eign Ministry and the Ministry of Economics, which are supported by the 
Permanent Representation of Germany to the EU in Brussels. 
As seen above the German Chancellor has the right to set general policy 
guidelines and to settle disputes in the Cabinet. The Chancellor’s Office 
however only contains reflecting units (Spiegelreferate) of the ministries in 
charge of particular policies. Also in European affairs it only assumes is-
sues of special importance such as the preparation of European Council 
meetings and priorities of the Chancellor e.g. the Lisbon Strategy and the 
German Council Presidency in cooperation with the ministries. The Chan-
 
50  Law on Cooperation between Federal Government and the German Bundestag Con-
cerning EU Affairs (EUZBBG) and the Law on Cooperation between Federal Gov-
ernment and the Federal States in EU Affairs (EUZBLG). 
51  Thomas, Anja & Wessels, Wolfgang (2006). Die Deutsche Verwaltung und die Eu-
ropäische Union, Bonn: Bundesakademie für öffentliche Verwaltung im Bundes-
ministerium des Inneren, p.156. The new German European Policy 
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cellor’s office has to balance the interests of the political parties in gov-
ernment, which limits its action capability
52. In general, the German elec-
toral system favours party diversity, that makes it necessary to form 
coalition governments. As all parties involved want to decide upon the in-
creasingly important EU affairs, the centralisation of German EU policy 
coordination within one ministry or even the Chancellor’s Office is there-
fore politically undesirable. With the current government, Chancellor 
Merkel (CDU) and the Ministry of Economics (CSU – the Christian Social 
Union of Bavaria as sister party of the CDU) have to cooperate with the 
SPD-led Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Finance. As a result European 
policies might be subordinated to domestic party interests
53. The prior shift 
to the Ministry of Finance in 1998 was also partly due to power struggles 
between the former Chancellor Schröder and his deputy Oscar Lafon-
taine
54. A similar assessment can be made for the recent organisational 
amendments. The important EU coordination was reassigned to the Minis-
try of Economics in order to secure the influence of the CDU/CSU. Yet, the 
ministry of Finance has not lost all its EU responsibilities so that the re-
newed shift of competences diminished transparency. More actors in the 
already complex structure make decisions and a change in the status quo 
difficult
55. 
Today, the Foreign Ministry together with the Ministry of Economics is 
responsible for the coordination of European affairs. It aligns the German 
position for Coreper II, which are intergovernmental policies such as the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Justice and Home Affairs, institu-
tional reforms as the Constitutional Treaty and bilateral relations. The For-
eign Ministry is also in charge of general EU initiatives such as the Lisbon 
Strategy, the European Neighbourhood Policy and future EU enlargement. 
With the expansion of EU competences and domestic changes it could 
strengthen its position and set up special EU coordination units
56. This 
 
52  Thomas (2006), p. 114f. 
53  Haftendorn (1999), p. 250. 
54  Bulmer (2001), p. 24. 
55  Tsebelis, George (2002). Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, 
p. 17f 
56  Bulmer (2001), p. 11; Thomas (2006), p. 141. Christiana Tings 
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process also continued after the change in government e.g. it holds the sec-
retary for the German Council Presidency in 2007. The Foreign Ministry’s 
action capacity is nonetheless limited by other ministries and the Chancel-
lor’s Office. As the Ministry of Economics is in charge of Coreper I, the 
Foreign Ministry has almost no competences in substantive EU policies. 
Moreover, the Chancellor’s Office has the right to assume the leading posi-
tion for important issues.  
The Ministry of Economics traditionally plays a decisive role in the Ger-
man EU policy coordination, also due to the initial EU focus on economic 
integration. Since the 1950s, the ministry, which supported the Chancel-
lor’s Office during the negotiations for the European Coal and Steal Com-
munity (ECSC), coordinates German EU policy. It is responsible for 
Coreper I activities, which comprise e.g. the Internal Market, structural 
policies, trade relations and most other Community policies (EC)
57. There-
fore, it has to integrate diverging issues that are not part of its portfolio 
such as education and environmental affairs
58. In addition, its activities 
such as the Lisbon Strategy and energy policy overlap with the responsibil-
ity of other ministries and the Chancellor’s Office. Even though the Minis-
try of Economics regained general EU policy coordination after the last 
change in government, it has lost its leading role. The Ministry of Finance 
retained the responsibility of the Ecofin
59 Council, which is part of Coreper 
II and continues to ensure the budget compliance of all EU policies. The 
Ministry of Nutrition, Agriculture and Consumer Protection  is another ex-
ample for ministerial autonomy. It is directly in charge of the Agriculture 
and Fisheries Council and stays even outside inter-ministerial coordination 
units described below
60. The sharing of responsibilities between the differ-
ent ministries requires extensive coordination before a German position can 
be discussed and communicated on the European level.  
 
57  For a comprehensive study on EU policy system see: Hix, Simon. (2005). The Po-
litical System of the EU, New York: Palgrave. 
58  Thomas (2006), p. 143. 
59  Council of EU Economic and Finance Ministers (Ecofin). 
60  Bulmer (2001), p.12. The new German European Policy 
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In the Permanent Representation in Brussels civil servants from all minis-
tries come together to represent Germany in EU negotiations and provide 
their government with early-warning reports. The Head of the Permanent 
Representation is a high-ranking ambassador from the Foreign Ministry, 
while the Vice Representative is send from the Ministry of Economics. The 
German delegates to the EU act on behalf of the Federal Government and 
depend on timely instructions (Weisungen). This is especially important as 
“member states frequently trade support between themselves for one issue 
against another”
61. The need for domestic coordination in Berlin makes an 
early position and cooperation with other member states difficult. Germany 
might even have to abstain in the voting procedure due to delayed instruc-
tions for the permanent representative. In Great Britain the Cabinet Office 
coordinates the European activities of all national ministries. The French 
Sécretariat général des affaires européennes (SGAE) is directly subordi-
nated to the prime minister and represents France in European negotiations. 
Poland has a special minister without portfolio for European affairs. In 
comparison with more centralised governments the German system makes 
effective national interest representation difficult. Furthermore, the chang-
ing responsibility according to subject matters can lead to confusion in 
other member states about who the relevant actor is
62.  
Horizontal and Vertical Coordination 
Special coordination units have been established to align and communicate 
the German position. However, pressures of Europeanisation to centralise 
and examples of other member states have not been strong enough to alter 
the basic structure of the German state
63. The ministry with the broadest 
jurisdiction, after the consultation of other ministries and other domestic as 
well as international actors such as the European Commission, develops the 
initial German position towards a European policy issue (see Annex I). 
This has the advantage that the unit with the most expertise is in charge of 
 
61  Greenwood, Justin (2003). Interest Representation in the EU. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, p. 42. 
62  Bulmer (2001), p. 4f, p. 17. 
63  See Fuchs (2004). Christiana Tings 
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the matching EU policy. While the position for Coreper is aligned in two 
special committees, instructions for the working groups are directly con-
ferred to the delegates in the Permanent Representation or brought forward 
by the responsible civil servant from Berlin
64. 70 % of all EU policies are 
decided in the working groups. Less than 20 % are passed on to the Core-
per, and the Council of Ministers only examines the remaining political 
disputes
65. This underlines the importance of the low-level working groups 
and an early positioning in the EU decision-making process
66 
If there are new policy issues or disputes, vertical EU coordination commit-
tees become involved (see Annex II). Every Tuesday, the Coreper Coordi-
nation Committees with representatives from all ministries that are 
involved in pending issues meet in order to align the German activities. 
These are split according to the Council formations; the Ministry of Eco-
nomics sharing the Coreper I, and the Foreign Ministry the Coreper II 
Committee. If no coherent position can be found between the departments, 
the topic is passed on to the Head of Department Committee for EU affairs 
(EU-AL
67). They come together approximately once a month. The commit-
tee assisted by the deputy of the Permanent Representative prepares the 
general German line on working group level. Remaining issues are dis-
cussed in the Committee of State Secretaries for European Affairs, which is 
the highest-ranking administrative committee. This committee normally 
meets subsequent to the EU-AL
68. In the normal policy process, European 
legislation is only rarely passed on to the Cabinet. Then, the outcome de-
pends on the power position of the minister that is in charge of the policy 
field. In theory, the Chancellor has the final competence to decide.
69 In ear-
lier times, a special EU formation in the Cabinet followed the EU legisla-
 
64  Thomas (2006), p. 163. 
65  Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona & Wallace, Hellen (1997). The Council of Ministers, Lon-
don: Macmillan, p.78. 
66    See Janowski, Cordula (2006). Die nationalen Parlamente und ihre Europa-
Gremien. Baden Baden: Nomos. 
67  Europaabteilungsleiter (EU-AL) - Heads of Units with EU relevance. 
68  Prior and during the German Council Presidency the committees meet more fre-
quently and earlier in the same week or even the week before. Then, Germany also 
has to align its position with the Council’s Secretariat. 
69  Thomas (2006), pp.163 – 166. The new German European Policy 
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tive process. Due to the extension of EU competences and legislation this is 
not possible anymore. Nevertheless, a regular report of the EU State Minis-
ter in the Cabinet would integrate EU affairs better and support a coherent 
German position. The complex decision and coordination structures might 
obstruct effective national interest representation but on the other hand cor-
responds to the European policy process. However, due to the intransparent 
system there is a clear deficiency in the governmental communication and 
public dialogue about German EU policies.  
Communication of German EU Policy 
In Brussels, the Permanent Representation of Germany coordinates the 
contact with the media. In Berlin, the Public Office for Information of the 
German government is formally responsible for domestic public relations 
also with regard to European affairs. However recent years have shown that 
the complex internal structure can be an impediment to consistent and suc-
cessful EU-communication
70. The Foreign Ministry tried to close the gap 
between government action and public information. Together with the Pub-
lic Office for Information, the German representation of the European Par-
liament and the Commission, it established a round table on European 
affairs. The goal is to regularly inform civil society actors about German 
EU policy, especially before the country assumes the Council Presidency in 
2007. The round table discussions focus on a specific topic and contribute 
to the Aktion Europa of the German Government and the European Com-
mission. This initiative has the goal to improve the image of the EU in 
German society. The European Commissioner for Communication, Wall-
ström emphasised the need for better information policies in the so-called 
Plan D
71 and a Commission White Paper
72. Plan D postulates that it is “the 
 
70   Wulf-Mathies Monika & Hüttemann, Bernd (09/2005) Der deutsche Patient im 
Lazarett Europa Zur Europa Koordination und -Kommunikation in Deutschland, 
EU in Brief Berlin, Netzwerk Europäische Bewegung. 
71  Commission of the European Communities. The Commission’s contribution to the 
period of reflection and beyond: Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, 
Brussels: COM (2005) 494 final.  
72  Commission of the European Communities. White paper on a European communi-
cation policy, Brussels: COM (2006) 35 final.  Christiana Tings 
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responsibility of governments, at national, regional and local level, to con-
sult and inform citizens about public policy – including European policies 
and their impact on people’s daily lives – and to put in place the forums to 
give this debate life”
73. The Foreign Ministry’s initiative contributes to this 
endeavour, it is however only one of the ministries responsible for EU poli-
cies. The coordination between the Public Office for Information and the 
magnitude of German actors involved in EU policies remains difficult. In 
contrast to the coalition treaty of the current government, which pledged: 
“We have to recover lost confidence of the people and […] inform them 
better about the development of European policies”
74 Germany still lacks a 
coherent European communication strategy. The new information law
75 
(Informationsfreiheitsgesetz), which enables citizens to access internal ad-
ministrative papers, in theory even the early-warning reports from the Per-
manent Representation, is a first step towards more transparency. Through 
more information and dialogue, the support of German society for the EU 
could be raised again. The stagnation of the European integration process, 
exemplified by the negative referenda on the European Constitutional 
Treaty and the extension of the reflection phase, can only gain momentum 
again with the European citizens.  
5. Conclusions 
In Germany, the support for European integration is enshrined in Art. 23 
GG. It obliges political actors and the administration to align domestic in-
terests with European goals. The comparison between the old and new 
government in the framework of continuity and change underlines the con-
tinuity of Germany’s relations towards the EU. The main opponents in the 
last electoral campaign did not dispute European integration as such. The 
new government even restored traditional priorities of German EU policy. 
While Chancellor Schröder focused more on cooperation with bigger 
 
73  Commission (2006), p.5. 
74  Coalition Treaty (2005), p.126. 
75   Law to regulate the access to information of the federal government, Informations-
freiheitsgesetz (IFG) (BGBl. I S. 2722, 1. January 2006). The new German European Policy 
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(member) states and pursued a self-assured German foreign policy, the cur-
rent government emphasises multilateral cooperation in the European 
framework. The comparison of the coalition treaties as basis for all gov-
ernment action underlines the shift from bilateral relations between Ger-
many and France towards European cooperation. However, in daily politics 
the pro-European stance of Chancellor Merkel’s government is constrained 
by domestic policy problems. This leads to an increasing gap between po-
litical visions with regard to the EU and real political action. Further inte-
gration such as a common European energy policy is only supported by the 
German government if absolutely necessary. During the Council Presi-
dency in 2007 the German delegates have to act in the interest of the 
Community, which might show that common interest representation is 
more successful then short-time national prerogatives.  
The continuity and even restoration of German EU policy as seen in the 
policy part is also reflected in the institutional structure. The traditional 
separation of power between the Ministry of Economics and the Foreign 
Ministry has been restored and now even more actors are involved in the 
decision-making process. Pressures of Europeanisation to centralise and 
examples of other member states have not been strong enough to alter the 
basic structure of the German state. The departmental principle permits the 
direct involvement of ministerial experts in the increasingly complex Euro-
pean legislation process and makes EU affairs an intrinsic part of the na-
tional policy process. Moreover, the consolidation of German EU policy 
coordination within one ministry or even the Chancellor’s Office has not 
enough political support. Next to the inter-ministerial struggle for compe-
tence, the German coalition governments favour a split of responsibility, all 
the more so as the equal parties in the current grand coalition want to retain 
their influence on European policies. Nevertheless, a streamlined coordina-
tion could not only strengthen the German interest representation but also 
contribute to the communication and public dialogue about German EU 
policies.  
As a first step, European conferences with parliamentarians from all gov-
ernmental levels could foster the discourse on daily EU politics and future 
perspectives of German EU policies. This is especially important in the Christiana Tings 
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current reflection phase and as Germany is supposed to develop a road map 
for future integration during its Council Presidency in 2007. There, the 
government should report on the German policy agenda with regard and in 
correspondence to EU initiatives
76. Today’s roundtable on European affairs 
could contribute scientific expertise to the political discourse. 
Moreover, the distribution of competences in and between the German fed-
eral ministries could be streamlined. At the moment all ministries feature 
different organisation structures, which range from a single EU unit where 
all EU affairs come together to no coordination within the respective minis-
try. A common structure in all ministries would be helpful. Furthermore, 
the policy fields that are assigned to the Ministry of Economics, the For-
eign Ministry and further actors do not always follow the logic of Coreper I 
and II. In addition, some policies do not correspond to the actual expertise 
of the coordinating unit and some are assigned to several ministries. Even 
though the distribution of competences has developed incrementally a dis-
entanglement and distribution of power to the least possible actors is neces-
sary. As the centralisation of EU competence in the German Federal 
Government is no option, the Permanent Representation in Brussels will 
also in the future play a decisive role to streamline the German position. 
The delegates however depend on early positioning and instructions from 
Berlin.  
In the first months of its mandate the grand coalition has cooperated well in 
European affairs. However, all actions need to balance the interest of the 
almost equal coalition partners. The change in government has not led to an 
overall change in German EU policy. This is due to the continued internal 
division of EU competences and the lack of political will to amend this. It 
is important that European affairs are not subordinated to domestic power 
struggles. This requires a consequent leadership of the German Head of 
Government, the Chancellor. Challenges such as the Council Presidency in 
Spring 2007 and the reestablishment of European integration impetus re-
quire German EU capability. The country is bound to continuity in its       
 
76  Kühnhardt, Ludger (12/2005) Deutschlands Europapolitik verbessern. in: Die poli-
tische Meinung, Vol. 433 Europa, quo vadis?, pp.19-28, 22. The new German European Policy 
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policy and organisation structure. It has until now played an important role 
in the European integration process. However, actors and processes con-
stantly need to adapt to an expanding EU and changing prerequisites of 
European cooperation. Christiana Tings 
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Annex I: Departments (Abteilungen) and Units (Referate) in the German 
Federal Ministries that are responsible for European Affairs  
(Retrieved from the website of the German Government on 10 June 2006, http://www.bundesregierung.de) 
Ministry  Department n°  Units and task forces 
Employment and Social 
Policies 
VI a EU  5 units; task force preparation of the German Presidency of the Council 
of the EU in 2007 
Foreign Policies 
 
Chair of the Committee of 
State Secretaries for European 
affairs 
E Europe 
 
 
 
2 Political Department 
9 units; relations with EU institutions, bilateral relations and enlarge-
ment; EU-Coordination unit (E-KR), task force German Council Presi-
dency (AS-EU2007), task force German-French relations (F-V & AS-F), 
CFSP and ESDP (EU KOR ) 
Bilateral relations and CFSP 
Interior  G II, Europe & interna-
tional developments 
2 units; task force German Council Presidency 
Justice  IV International & Euro-
pean law 
Principle and legal questions of the EU  
Finance  E European Policies  17 units, mostly financial but also general EU affairs as well as EU law  
Economics and Technology 
ed EU coordination and deputy 
chair of EU State Secretary 
Committee 
E European Policies 
 
 
11 units, general coordination and e.g. Internal Market, European funds 
and bilateral relations, Germany’s representation at ECJ, other units are 
dispersed in the different departments concerning e.g.  SME, IT and 
energy policies  
Nutrition, Agriculture and 
Consumer Protection 
6 EU, international 
affairs, fisheries 
9 units 
Defence  PlStab Planning staff 
Fü S III Military policies 
and defence supervision 
R Law 
1 unit , ESDP, EU; Western European Union  
 
 
 
2 units 
Families, the Elderly, 
Women and Youth 
Coordination European 
Policies, Commissioner 
for European affairs 
(only ministry with 
central coordination) 
5 children and youth 
Commissioner at the Permanent Representation (INT) 
 
 
 
 
 
European Youth Policies 
Health  E European health poli-
cies 
3 Prevention, & disease 
control 
3 units, representative for Health at Permanent Representation 
 
 
European and international affairs 
Traffic, Construction and 
Urban Development 
A General affairs  European and international traffic cooperation 
Environment, Environ-
mental Protection and Reac-
tor Safety 
KI Climate protection, 
renewable energies 
WA 
Water 
2 units 
 
General and principal as well as international and European affairs of 
the water industry (WA I 1) 
Education and Research  2 European cooperation  
7 Research 
6 units 
 
European Research Organisations (715) 
Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
3 European policies  EU 
 
Chancellor’s Office  5 European policies  General and foreign affairs; EU Presidency  
Coordination of EU policies with economic aspects  A
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